Commonwealth v. Dilworth: Social Media Surveillance, Equal Protection, and Law Enforcement Privilege
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Richard Dilworth highlights important intersections between modern law enforcement techniques, social media surveillance, and constitutional protections. At the core of the case are two significant legal issues: first, the extent to which law enforcement's use of undercover social media accounts can be subject to equal protection challenges, and second, the balance between a defendant's right to discovery and the government’s claim of privilege to protect ongoing investigations and confidential informants.
In this case, the Court upheld the dismissal of firearms charges against Richard Dilworth due to the Commonwealth's refusal to comply with a discovery order requiring the disclosure of Snapchat surveillance information. This ruling is a critical development in understanding how courts address the legal boundaries of electronic surveillance, the limits of police discretion, and the broader constitutional framework of equal protection and selective prosecution claims.
Background and Case Overview
Richard Dilworth was indicted in 2018 on charges of unlawful possession of firearms after Boston police officers, using undercover Snapchat accounts, observed him brandishing weapons in several videos. Officers tracked Dilworth and eventually arrested him in possession of firearms. The social media surveillance was part of a broader strategy by the Boston Police Department’s Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF), which targeted suspected gang members through online platforms.
From 2018 to 2021, Dilworth’s defense team filed multiple discovery motions, alleging that the Boston Police Department’s use of Snapchat monitoring disproportionately targeted Black and Hispanic individuals, in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The defense sought detailed information on the racial composition of individuals subjected to social media monitoring, as well as the usernames and profile icons of the undercover Snapchat accounts used by law enforcement.
The discovery orders issued by the trial court required the Commonwealth to disclose this information, reasoning that it was essential to support the defendant’s claim of racial profiling. The Commonwealth, however, repeatedly refused to comply, citing law enforcement privilege and the need to protect ongoing investigations and the safety of officers and confidential informants. This led the trial court to dismiss the case with prejudice, a decision that was subsequently appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Key Legal Issues
The Commonwealth v. Dilworth case involves several key legal questions, including the following:
The Application of Equal Protection in Social Media Surveillance
The Scope of Law Enforcement Privileges
Sanctions for Discovery Violations
1. The Application of Equal Protection in Social Media Surveillance
One of the central issues in this case was whether the police's use of social media surveillance to target suspected gang members could be subjected to an equal protection challenge. Dilworth's defense team argued that the Boston Police Department’s monitoring of Snapchat accounts disproportionately targeted Black and Hispanic individuals, making the surveillance practice discriminatory and unconstitutional.
The court had to decide whether the equal protection framework articulated in Commonwealth v. Long (2020), which dealt with racial profiling in traffic stops, extended to social media surveillance. In Long, the court revised the evidentiary burden for defendants raising equal protection claims, making it easier for them to challenge discriminatory law enforcement practices. Under the Long standard, a defendant only needs to present evidence that would allow a reasonable person to infer that the police discriminated on the basis of race or another protected class. Once such evidence is presented, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the law enforcement action was based on race-neutral reasons.
In Dilworth, the Commonwealth argued that social media surveillance was fundamentally different from physical traffic stops or pedestrian searches and should not be subject to the same level of scrutiny under the Long framework. The Commonwealth contended that covertly monitoring someone’s Snapchat account, after obtaining their consent to "friend" them, did not constitute the same type of intrusive police action that warranted equal protection safeguards.
The Court, however, rejected this argument, holding that social media surveillance could indeed be subject to an equal protection challenge. It determined that the Long standard applied not only to physical interactions like traffic stops but also to investigatory practices like social media monitoring. The Court emphasized that the central concern of equal protection is discriminatory treatment based on race, regardless of whether the police action involves a physical intrusion. In this context, the use of Snapchat to surveil individuals could potentially be discriminatory if it disproportionately targeted members of certain racial or ethnic groups.
The Court’s decision highlights a critical evolution in equal protection jurisprudence, affirming that modern surveillance techniques—especially those used in the digital realm—must be scrutinized for potential racial biases just as traditional law enforcement methods are.
2. The Scope of Law Enforcement Privileges
Another key legal issue in the case was the Commonwealth’s assertion of law enforcement privilege to justify withholding the Snapchat usernames, profile icons (bitmojis), and other information used in undercover social media accounts. The Commonwealth argued that disclosing this information would jeopardize ongoing investigations, compromise the anonymity of undercover officers, and endanger confidential informants.
The law recognizes several types of privilege that allow the government to withhold certain information in criminal cases, including the surveillance location privilege and the confidential informant privilege. These privileges are designed to protect law enforcement’s ability to conduct effective investigations by keeping the identities of informants and the locations of surveillance operations secret.
In Dilworth, the Commonwealth contended that these privileges applied to the undercover Snapchat accounts used by the police. The police, the Commonwealth argued, had a legitimate interest in protecting the usernames and icons associated with these accounts, as disclosing them could render the accounts useless in future investigations and expose undercover officers to potential harm.
The trial court, however, was not persuaded by the Commonwealth’s arguments. It found that the Commonwealth had not provided sufficient evidence to justify the application of these privileges in this particular context. The court reasoned that undercover Snapchat accounts are "infinitely renewable" resources—meaning that the police could easily create new accounts if the current ones were compromised. Moreover, the court noted that the Commonwealth had not demonstrated that disclosing usernames or profile images would necessarily endanger officers or informants, especially given the possibility of redacting sensitive information or submitting the materials for in-camera review (a process where the judge reviews the documents privately).
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed with the trial court’s findings, concluding that the Commonwealth had not properly asserted a privilege in this case. The Court acknowledged that there may be circumstances where undercover social media accounts could be privileged, but on the facts of this case, the Commonwealth had not met its burden of proving that the disclosure of the requested information would harm ongoing investigations or compromise officer safety.
This aspect of the ruling underscores the importance of transparency and accountability in law enforcement’s use of modern surveillance techniques. While certain privileges are necessary to protect sensitive aspects of police work, courts must carefully evaluate whether those privileges apply in each case and whether alternative measures (such as redactions or in-camera review) can adequately protect both the government’s interests and the defendant’s right to discovery.
3. Sanctions for Discovery Violations
The most controversial aspect of the Dilworth decision was the trial court’s sanction of dismissing the case with prejudice due to the Commonwealth’s refusal to comply with the discovery orders. Dismissing a case with prejudice is a severe remedy because it permanently terminates the prosecution and bars the government from refiling the charges. Courts typically reserve this sanction for cases where the government’s misconduct is particularly egregious, and where no lesser sanction would adequately protect the defendant’s rights.
In this case, the trial court found that the Commonwealth’s refusal to comply with the discovery orders constituted an "egregious" violation. The Commonwealth had not only failed to provide the requested information but had also refused to consider any alternative measures, such as redacting sensitive details or submitting documents for in-camera review. The court concluded that the Commonwealth’s non-compliance effectively deprived Dilworth of the ability to develop his equal protection defense and left the court with no reasonable alternative but to dismiss the case.
On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion, particularly given the importance of the firearms charges and the government’s interest in public safety. The Commonwealth proposed that the court allow the case to proceed without the requested discovery, with the understanding that Dilworth could raise the issue on appeal if convicted.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, upheld the trial court’s decision, emphasizing that dismissal was warranted given the specific circumstances of the case. The Court noted that the trial court had carefully considered other options but found that none of them would adequately address the Commonwealth’s discovery violations. The Commonwealth’s refusal to comply with the discovery orders had effectively denied Dilworth the opportunity to present a full and fair defense, and under these circumstances, dismissal was an appropriate sanction.
The ruling serves as a stark reminder to prosecutors and law enforcement agencies that non-compliance with discovery orders—especially in cases involving potential constitutional violations—can result in severe consequences, including the dismissal of charges.
Conclusion and Broader Implications
The Commonwealth v. Dilworth decision has far-reaching implications for both law enforcement and criminal defense in the age of social media surveillance. The case underscores that modern surveillance techniques, such as the use of undercover social media accounts, are not immune from constitutional scrutiny. Courts will closely examine whether such practices disproportionately target certain racial or ethnic groups, and defendants have the right to access relevant discovery materials to challenge potentially discriminatory law enforcement practices.
At the same time, the case highlights the limitations of law enforcement privileges in the context of digital surveillance. While privileges are essential to protect ongoing investigations and officer safety, they must be properly asserted and justified on a case-by-case basis. Blanket assertions of privilege will not suffice, especially when there are alternative measures available to protect sensitive information.
Finally, the decision serves as a cautionary tale for prosecutors who fail to comply with discovery orders. Courts will not hesitate to impose severe sanctions, including dismissal, when the government’s non-compliance interferes with a defendant’s right to a fair trial