Limits of the Human Trafficking Charges in MA: Commonwealth v. Brendan Garafalo
In the case before the court, five defendants were charged with violating Massachusetts G.L. c. 265, § 50, commonly known as the "human trafficking" statute, after responding to advertisements posted by the State police and subsequently being arrested in a sting operation. The indictments were dismissed by a Superior Court judge on the grounds that because the advertisements were fake and there was no actual victim, the "another person" requirement of the statute was not met.
The court's decision addressed two key issues: whether the Commonwealth could establish the "another person" element of the crime in the context of a sting operation, and whether the defendants' conduct satisfied the statutory requirement of "recruit, entice . . . or obtain by any means" another person.
Regarding the first issue, the court concluded that factual impossibility is not a defense to a crime, and therefore, the Commonwealth could meet the "another person" element even in a sting operation where no actual victim exists. The defendants' intent to engage in commercial sexual activity with another person, albeit a fictitious one, was sufficient to establish probable cause.
However, on the second issue, the court found that the evidence presented to the grand jury did not establish that the defendants attempted to recruit, entice, or obtain another person as required by the statute. The defendants merely responded to advertisements offering sexual services without taking actions to cause another person to engage in such activities.
While the language of the human trafficking statute is broad, the court interpreted it narrowly in this context, holding that the statute does not extend to conduct that merely responds to an offer from another person without causing or controlling the offering of commercial sex. As such, the court affirmed the dismissal of the indictments.
This decision underscores the importance of carefully considering the elements of a crime and the specific circumstances of each case when interpreting statutory language in the context of criminal law.