Race, Representation, and the Alternate Juror Dilemma in Commonwealth v. Maraj
Introduction
The Massachusetts case of Commonwealth v. Maraj presents an important discussion on the selection of alternate jurors, particularly when race is a factor in jury composition. This blog post explores the legal framework, judicial discretion, and constitutional implications surrounding the trial court’s decision to select an alternate juror randomly, despite the defense’s objections.
Case Background
Kristian Maraj was convicted of reckless operation of a motor vehicle following a high-speed chase that ended in a crash. His appeal raised two main arguments:
The trial judge erred by allowing the only Black juror to be randomly selected as an alternate, excluding them from deliberations.
The judge improperly instructed the jury on elements of the charged offense.
This post focuses on the first issue, examining whether the trial court had discretion to prevent the exclusion of a juror based on race.
Legal Framework for Selecting Alternate Jurors
Under Massachusetts law, alternate jurors are selected according to G. L. c. 234A, § 68, which mandates that the process must be random. The statute provides:
"The court shall direct the clerk to place the names of all of the available jurors except the foreperson into a box or drum and to select at random the names of the appropriate number of jurors necessary to reduce the jury to the proper number of members required for deliberation."
The use of the word "shall" eliminates judicial discretion in altering this selection method.
Defense’s Argument and the Court’s Response
The defense sought to exclude the only Black juror from the random draw, arguing that removing them would deprive Maraj of a jury that represented his peers. The judge, however, ruled that deviating from the required random process would be both unlawful and improper, stating:
"I believe the law prohibits me from doing what you’re asking. So I’m going to deny your request as a matter of law, not of discretion."
Despite defense counsel’s repeated objections, the random selection process proceeded, and the Black juror was chosen as an alternate and thus excluded from deliberations.
Constitutional Implications
Maraj’s appeal argued that this process infringed upon his constitutional rights, particularly under the Sixth Amendment (right to an impartial jury) and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the appellate court rejected these arguments, citing established case law:
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that jury composition must be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, but that does not guarantee proportional representation on every individual jury.
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has upheld random selection procedures as constitutionally valid.
Precedent and Case Law
The Massachusetts Appeals Court referenced Commonwealth v. Santa Maria, where a trial judge improperly designated a specific juror as an alternate. In that case, the appellate court ruled that random selection is the fairest method for both parties and that altering it could compromise public confidence in the judicial system.
Additionally, the court noted that while the foreperson selection process allows for some discretion, no law mandates that a judge must pick a specific person for that role to achieve a certain racial composition.
Why Random Selection Matters
The principle behind random selection is fairness. Allowing courts to modify the alternate juror process based on race could open the door to future judicial manipulation, creating a slippery slope that undermines the integrity of the jury system. While the defense raised valid concerns about representation, the law prioritizes uniformity in jury selection procedures over case-specific alterations.
Final Ruling and Impact
The Massachusetts Appeals Court upheld Maraj’s conviction, finding no error in the trial judge’s adherence to statutory procedures. The decision reaffirms that:
Judges must follow the mandated random selection process for alternates.
Race cannot be a factor in altering juror selection procedures.
A jury does not have to be demographically representative of the defendant’s race as long as it is drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Maraj highlights the tension between procedural fairness and concerns over racial representation in jury selection. While the defense’s argument carried weight in broader discussions of systemic bias, the law’s strict mandate for random alternate juror selection prevailed. This case serves as an important precedent in safeguarding the neutrality of jury selection processes and ensuring that courts adhere to statutory mandates rather than making case-by-case exceptions based on race.